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Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between money growth, inflation, and productive activity
in a general equilibrium model where search frictions motivate the transactions role of money.
The use of a multiple matching technique, where search frictions are captured by limited
consumption variety, allows us to study price determination in a search-theoretic environment
with divisible money and goods. We find that in such a setting, a positive feedback between
work and shopping effort decisions create a channel by which inflation can positively influence
real activity. This feature also creates the possibility ofmultiple steady state equilibria. We also
analzye the impact of inflation on capital accumulation, the role search frictions play in
determiningthe extent to which inflation distorts relative prices, and the effect of money growth
on firm entry on trade frictions. In doing so, we demonstrate that a multiple matching model of
money is amendable to study a wide range oftraditional issues in monetary theory.
JEL Classifications: E31, E4 1
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The relationship between money growth, inflation, and real activity is a classic and much
debated issue in monetary economics. Contraryto the Phillips curve view ofdecades past, general
equilibrium models of money tend to favor the conclusion that steady inflation is disruptive to
economic activity. For example, money growth in cash-in-advance models with production
[Stockman (1981) and Cooley and Hansen (1989)] generates a pure inflation tax effect which
discourages market activities requiring cash. As a result, consumption, workeffort, output, and the
capital stock all decline with the inflation rate. Shopping time and money-in-the utility function
models [e.g., McCallum and Goodfriend (1988)] also have a similar prediction. However, these
approaches and theirpredictions have raised some concerns.
First, they approximatetrade frictionswhich give rise to a transactions role formoney in an
otherwise Wairasian setting. Such a theoretical short-cut leads these approaches to overlook the
impactofmoney growth and inflation on the very frictions which giverise to moneyas a medium
ofexchange. Secondly, evidence of a consistently negative relationship between inflation and
economic activity is far from conclusive. While some cross-country studies and evidence from
hyperinflationepisodes [e.g., Fischer(1983), Cooley and Hansen(1989), and Aiyagari and Eckstein
(1994)] find a negative correlation between inflation and output growth, these findings may be
influenced by the observation that countries with sustained high inflation also experiencehighly
variable inflation.’ A recent study by Bullard and Keating (1995) finds that a negative money-
output growth correlation is absent from stableprice industrialized countries.
‘As argued by Jones and Manuelli (1995), it maybe this variability ofhigh inflation, rather
than the level itself, which generates distortions and disrupts economic activity.
1This paperevaluates theconsequences ofmoney growthand inflation on economic activity
in the context of a search/matching model of money that highlights the decentralized and costly
nature oftheexchange process. Search theoreticapproaches to monetary theoryemphasizethat the
use of a medium ofexchange minimizes the time or resource costs associated with searchingfor
exchange opportunities, hence alleviatingthe “doublecoincidence ofwants” problem with barter.
The seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989,1991,1993) formalizes this aspect of monetary
exchange in the search equilibrium paradigm ofDiamond(1982,1984).
The particular search framework we adopt is based upon a “multiple” matching model of
money developed by Laing, Li, Wang (1997). Such an approach, while embodying the “double
coincidence ofwants” frictions, utilizes an environment which allows us to relax restrictions on the
divisibility and storabilityofgoods and money often imposedin search-theoretic models ofmoney.2
The key features which allows us to accomplish this in a tractable manner are (i) abandoning a
sequentialsearch structureand having buyers contactmultiple numbers ofsellers in a given period
and (ii) households having a preference forconsumption variety and consuming baskets ofgoods.
This ensures that therewill always be a subset ofgoods among those contactedwhich the household
2 Inthe prototypical search model ofmoney,exchange is characterizedby one-for-one swaps
of goodsand money,implying fixed prices. Extensions ofthe Kiyotaki-Wrightmodel with
divisible goods but indivisible moneyto include pricing include Trejos and Wright (1993,1995)
and Shi (1994). Among the first to consider the implications ofinflation in search-theoretic
models ofmoney is Li(1994,1995). However, because ofthese restrictions, inflation was
modeled as a tax on money balances given fixed nominal prices.
2finds desirable and hencekeeps the steadystatedistribution ofcash/goods trivial.3 Search frictions
and market incompleteness are captured by limitations in the number of sellers that buyers can
contact in a given period and hence limited consumption variety. An analogy ofthis process is a
consumer who shops in a marketplace and encounters many different products but not all desired
products in the economy. The model is closed by specifying prices set by monopolistically
competitive firms selling differentiated products and acircular flow ofincome between households
and firms. Laing, Li, and Wang (1996) demonstrates that, given the doublecoincidence problem,
monetary exchange improves trading opportunities relative to barter by increasing consumption
variety.
Since theemphasisofthis study is on inflation and monetary ratherthanbarterexchange, the
model simplifies and extends Laing, Li, and Wang (1997) to focus on a pure currency search
economy. In ourbasic set-up thereis a competitivelabor market and aproductmarket withrandom
matching. Households allocate theirtime overwork effort, shopping time, and leisure. They supply
laborto firms and receive a cash wage payment. They thenproceed to the goods market and are
randomly matched with a subset of monopolistically competitive firms that set prices. It is the
choice ofshopping time which endogenizes the matchingtechnology and influences the extent of
trade frictions. Once cash is exchanged for desired goods, consumption occurs and firms use
receipts to finance wage payments.
~The main (technical) difficulty behind direct extensions ofthe Kiyotaki-Wright framework
to include prices and divisible inventories is that it leads to an endogenous distributionofcash
and goods which must be determinedjointly with prices. Recent work attempting to characterize
pricing behavior and the distribution ofcash include Green and Zhou (1995), Corbae and Camera
(1996), Zhou (1996), and Molico (1996). Shi (1997) circumvents thedistributional issues with a
structure where largehouseholds consist ofa continuum oftraders.
3This framework is then usedto study theeffects oftrade frictions, money growth and steady
inflation on exchange activity, labor allocation, and production decisions. With a given time
allocated to shopping, an exogenous reduction in tradefrictions increases labor supply, overall work
effort, and economic activity. On the other hand, money growth creates an inflation tax which a
reallocation away from work effort to leisure. Similar to conventional models, inflation discourages
market activity and real output.
However, by allowing shopping time and the matching technology to vary in response to the
money growthrate, the results can be very different. In particular, not only can moneygrowth and
steady inflation encourage both work effort and shopping effort, but there also exists the possibility
ofmultiple steadystates. Intuitively, a greater matchingrate encourages work effortand the higher
labor income generated from work effort encourages shopping time. It is precisely this positive
feedback betweenwork and shopping efforts which whyinflation canencourage market activity and
the possibility of multiple equilibria.4
We thenconsider several variants ofthebasic model. First, the introduction ofproductive
capital allows us to characterize equilibrium capital accumulation. We find that a positive
relationship between inflation and capital can exist in equilibriawhere inflation positively affects
work and shopping effort. Second, we analyze how search frictions and inflation distort relative
prices in a model where households engage in the “homeproduction” of a perfectly competitive
homogenous good. Finally, weconsideran alternativewayofendogenizing thematchingtechnology
~It should also be noted that ournotion of“shopping time” is very different from shopping
time models ofmoney. In these models money is valued because it directlyincreases the value
ofleisure. However,while possessing fiat currency in a world where it is generally accepted
reduces exchange costs, it is not immediate whythe quantity of moneyitself saves on these costs.
Our model captures the notion that shopping time is a costly activity requiredfor exchange.
4by introducing firm entry. We find that not only that can money growth encourage firm
participation, but if a preferenceforvariety is sufficiently large, this entryeffect maydominate the
inflation tax effect, leading to a positive optimal rate ofinflation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II will outline the basic model and characterize
equilibrium conditions. Section ifi then analyzes the steady state of the model with both a fixed
matching rateand endogenous shopping time. Section 1Y looks at extensionsto the basic model to
include productive capital, relative prices, and firm entry. Finally, Section V will conclude with a
summary.
II. AMultiple Matching Model ofMoney
Goods, Preferences, and Production
Time is discrete and theeconomyis populated by a continuum ofinfinitely lived households
(indexedby h E H) and firms, with eachoftheirmassesnormalizedto unity. There is alargenumber
of differentiated commodities of mass one, indexed by ü E Q. Each firm can only produce a
particular good using labor asthe sole input sothat firms can also be indexedby ~. A household
oftype h desires a variety of goods over a subset Q(h)c Q. The commodity space is ordered in so
that aworkeroftype h, employed by a particularfirm, produces a good outside ofhis/herpreference
domain, Q(h), so that thereis no double coincidence ofwants between them.5 In this way, we rule
~This model can support thepossibility ofa double coincidence of wants and barter between
households and firms by specifying carefully households’and owners’ preferences over a random
subsetofgoods. Laing, Li and Wang (1997) does precisely this, proves theexistenceofboth barter
and pure monetary equilibria, and shows that under some conditions, the pure monetary equilibrium
is welfare-enhancing compared to barter. Since the present study focuses strictly on the pure
monetary equilibrium, the detailed structure to support fiat currency willnot be elaborated.
5out theuninteresting case ofautarky aswell as any possible matches/exchanges between a worker
and his/her employer. We also adoptthe Diamond-Yellen(1990)convention in that associated with
each firm ~ is an infinitely lived ownerwho desires good ~ and acts as the residualclaimant ofthe
firm’s output.6 All exchanges occur between households and firms as only workers/shoppers are
mobile. Both goods and money are perfectly divisible and agents can store money and their own
production goods in any amount without cost.
We make the following assumptions regarding household and firm ownerpreferences and
theproduction technology.
Assumption 1: (Household Preferences). The lifetime utilityforhousehold h E H is given by,
V = ~PtU(D1(~),L1) (1)
where U[.] is strictly increasing and quasi-concave in its arguments, and D~is a composite
consumption good given by
1-1 _L~
= f c/w) ~d o y-l (2)
(~)CU(h)
where ~ E (0,1) is the subjective time-discount factor, L~ is leisure at time t, ç(~) is household
consumption of good ~, and the composite consumption good captures the preference for
consumption variety and has the constant elasticity form with ‘y > 1 denoting the elasticity of
6 This feature of the model is without loss of generality since it is, as we shall see below,
consistent with profit maximization. Alternatively, we can also consider a more complex
environment where households arethemselves theowners offirms and receive dividend payments
via a stock market.
6substitution across varieties.7
Assumption 2: (Firm OwnerPreferences). Fortheowneroffirm~ E ~ desires good o, his lifetime
utility is
= EP~(~) (3)
where êis ownershipconsumption ofhis own productiongood.
Assumption 3: (Production Technology). The productiontechnology offirm~ is given by
y1(o) = f[l~(~)] (4)
wherel(~)is theemployment (density) andfsatisfiesf’> 0,f”< 0,f(0)=0 and theInadaconditions,
1im10f’(l) = °oandlim1~f’(l)= 0.
Labor and ProductMarkets
At the beginning of each period households allocate their time to either work effort, i~,
shopping time (or“effort”), s~ and leisure, L~ = 1 - 4 - 5r Household’s possess the abilityto produce
manytypes ofgoods but can only be productive at a single firmper period. Firm ~ E ~ offers a
competitivelaborcontract to households h e Hwhich paysa nominal cash wage W~(w) in exchange
for the household’s labor services 4.8 With this, the firm produces output y(~) according to the
production technology given by (3).
~ For large values of~y, varieties arecloser substitutes. This type ofpreferences is standard in
the monopolistic competition literature, e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
8 In thegeneralized version ofthe model with barter and monetary exchange, this contractcan
also consist ofwage payments in the firm’s output. The composition ofthis optimalcontract
betweengoods and cash then determines equilibrium tradingregimes. A pure monetary
economy is one where this contract pays only cash wages.
7Once household h E H receivewages from the competitive labormarket, they travel to the
goods market in which they arerandomly matched with a set of X~ c ~(h) firms with measure cc.
We make the followingassumption regardingthis matching technology:
Assumption 4: (Matching Technology). The measureoffirms contactedby a particularhousehold
h is given by ct(s,), where&(s~) 0 and a(0) 0.
Thus, a~ can be thought of as a “matching” rate which measures the severity of search
frictions in the goods market. It is endogenized by the household investment decision in shopping
time.9.
After matching,trades occur at monetary pricesP~(~) set by therelevant monopolistically
competitive firms, households consume c,(~)for each ~ e~ X, and firms owners consume their
residual output ê(o).
The MoneySupplyProcess
Lump-sumtransfers ofcash from themonetary authority occur to both households and firms
after the labor market closes but before the goods market opens. Thus, firms must finance wage
payments with cashreceipts accumulated from theprevious period’s sales.’°LetX~ denotethis cash
transfer, where a portion T, = OX, is given to households and i~= (1-O)X, is given to firms, with 0
~Technically, the set offirms contacted by households contain a countable numberoffirms.
However, given a sufficiently dense productspace, weapproximate the consumer’s aggregation
over his desirable commodities as a continuum as defined in (1). An immediate consequence of
this approximation is that the pricing behavioroffirms will involve pure substitution effects and
eliminate wealth effects.
~ This timing ofevents should not be thought ofas a cash-in-advanceconstraint on firms. It
is the ex-post outcome ofthe richer environmentwhere firms have the option ofaccumulating
goodsfor thepayment ofwages.
8e [0.1].” With this, wecan writethe (per capita) money supplyprocess asM~÷,=M ~+X~ = (1+~i)M ~
where ji is the money growth rate, and X, = 7~+
Optimization and Equilibrium
In each period, eachhousehold oftype h is matched with a set ofx products with measure
a in theirdesirable consumption set ~(h). Includedin this set are firms setting a common monetary
price P and a set of positive measure of deviating firms (denoted by Q’), with the representative
deviating firm (indexed by o’) setting a monetary priceofP’.
The representative household’s problem is given by choosing {c,(~),c,(~’),1,,s~,M~÷, } to
maximize (1), subjectto






= fc~(~) ~d~ ~1, (5)
~(h)
and M,÷, is the beginning-qf-period household money holdings. With ~ denoting the multiplier
associated with (6) the first-order conditions, evaluated atthe limiting casewhere the measureof ~‘
vanishes, are given by
~ = (6)
“The liquidityeffect literature [Lucas(1990), Fuerst(1992)] motivates a special case ofthis
cash transfer process where0-~0 and firms use the additional transfers to finance theirwage bill.
9= (7)
UL(D,L) = ~ (8)
UL(D,L) = UD(D,L)~12- (9)
M~+1{X~ — = 0 (10)
Equations (1) and (2) imply a relationship betweenc(~)andc(~’) given by
c~(~) —lIy — p1
c~(c1/) p1’
Substituting this into (6)yields the household’sconsumption demands:
Wi+T Wi+T





Equation (11) implies each consumer’s demand,c(~’), decreases with its price P’ and ata ratethat
depends upon the elasticity ofsubstitution y. An increase in total cash receipts, given by W~i, +
raises the demandforall goods proportionately. The consumer’s preferenceforvariety implies that
the share oftheir income apportioned to eachgood declines with the numberoftrading partners a
contacted.
Noting that as the set ofdeviating firms are arbitrarilysmall, aD/8s~ = y/(y-1)a’~’~a’(s,) c.
Using this, (6), (8), and (9), the efficiencyconditions forworkeffort and shopping time are
10W ~
UL(D,L) = UD(D,L)—~ a(s1)Y
1 (12)
= —a”(s~)c~ (13)
Equation (12) simply equates the marginal disutility of work effort with the marginal utility of
consumption that can be supported by theadditional wage income. Equation (13) says that while
work effort raises the overall level ofconsumption by the additional realwage, themarginal benefits
ofshopping time is the additional varietywhich canbe purchased with agiven level ofincome. The
latter is strictly increasing in the preference forvariety (i.e. decreasing in y).
Finally, from (10) note that a necessary condition for M,÷, > 0 is given by ~ = or
(Ud~DC/PU~+IDCt+I }(P,÷,/P,) = 1. This condition implies that the opportunity cost ofholding cash (or
implicit nominal interest rate) is zero. We will impose that this cost be strictly positive, which in
the steady state corresponds to the restriction that p > 13- 1. Consequently, since the cash transfer
occurs before the goods market opens, thehousehold ends eachperiod with zero money holdings or
M,~1
= 0 V t. Thus, the household choosesan optimal sequence {c~, c/, 4, s,} solving (11), (12), and
(13) given prices and wage {P,, P,’, W,}.
We nowconsider the optimalpricesetting behaviorofa deviating firm ~‘ which takes the
price set by all other firms as given and sets thebest response Nashequilibrium priceP’. In a pure
monetary equilibrium eachownerconsumes theresidualoutputofit’s firmsothat the firm’s problem
is consistent with profit maximization. The representative deviating firm takes the consumption





— ac1(o’) — ê1(c~’) 0 (14)
fi + aP(ü)~’)c(c~~”) + — W1l1((~)’) — 0 (15)
W1i1(u~) (16)
Inequality (14) is the firm’s resourceconstraint, and says that output is either consumedorelse sold
to other households. Inequality (15) is the firm’s flow budget constraint requiringthat total cash
balances atthe beginning ofnext periodcannot exceed the sum ofcurrent period money balances,
receipts from sales, and the monetary transfer less cash wage payments. Finally, (16) is due to the
absenceofcapital markets, and indicates that the firm cannothire more laborthan is warranted by
its current cash balances.
Itwill be convenient to characterizea stationaryequilibrium by scaling all nominal variables
by the beginning-of-period money stock. With ,h1 I~M~s, w, = W,/M~S,and p, = P~/M~, we can
write (15) and (16) as




12and express the firm’s value functionas
V(th1) = max f[l1(c~Y)] — ac1(c~Y)+ 13V(th1~,)
l(c~V),p’
With (15’) and (16’) strictly binding, the first order conditions, given in the Appendix, yields a Nash
equilibrium in the price-setting game where
~l, w,~1(1+p)
= (~ij) 13f’(11~,) (17)
Intuitively, the monopolistic markup ofprice over nextperiod wages depends negatively on ‘y and
nextperiod’s marginal productivity. Sincefirms must finance wage payments with cash receipts
carried over from last period, the marginalcost ofhiring labor, and hence the markup, is increasing
with the inflation rate p. As p -~ 13-1 and y -~ co, the inverse markup approaches the marginal
productivity oflabor.
Thefirmchooses an optimal sequence {p,’, ê,, l,} solving (14), (16’), and (17) given prices
and wages(p,, wj. Labor and money market clearing implies that l,chosen by firms and households
are identical and that th1= ‘~ = 1. We now characterize the steady state of the economy’s
equilibrium.
Definition 1: A symmetric steady-state monetary equilibrium is given by quantities {c*,(c*)’,l*,s*
and prices {p*, (p*)’,w*} satisfying
~y w~(1÷p)
P = (—) (18)
y-l pf/(l*)
13* 1+Op






= (2L)ç~~(s ~)c* (21)
y-l
where p”~ = (p*)’, c* = (c*)’, w~ = 1/1*, L* = I - i~ - s”~,and from (18), (19), and (2),
D * = a(s*)~I * = a~(’~0~)(~)13f’(i ~)l* (22)
1+p y
Notice that a convenientway ofexpressing condition (20) is by substituting in (18), (19) and (22)
and writing it in terms of the ratio of the elasticity of substitution of leisure to composite
consumption
F(D4,L4) i(l+O~t) = 1 (23)
1 — i~— S
4
where I’ ~L’~D and ~ = ULL, ~ = DDD.
III. Trade Frictions, Inflation, and Real Activity
This section analyzes the existence of steadystate equilibria and investigates the model’s
steady state implications for money growth, inflation, and real activity. First, we will consider
equilibriawith a fixedshopping effort and matching rate. Thenweconsiderthegeneral model which
allows shopping effort to vary optimally.
14For convenience, and to make our analysis more concrete, we will adopt some specific
functional forms for preferences and technology. In particular, let f(l) = i’~,consider a linear
matching technology a(s)= a0
+ a,s,;, a1 0, and let preferences be given by U(D,L) = [i1D~ +
(l-ri)L~]”~, where r~ ~ (0,1) and p E [0,1]. This CES specification embodies both the linear case
where p -. 1 and the Cobb Douglas case where p -~ 0. It implies that theelasticity ofsubstitution
ratiois given by F = {(1-ri)/ri}(L/D)~.With this, condition (23) is givenby
1—ri l4(l+Op) = 1 (24)
11 (D4)~(1— l~ — *)1~
Equilibria with a Fixed Matching Technology
Consider the casewhere the matching rateis fixed at a = a0 so thats~ = 0.
Proposition 1. Given a = a0, there exists a unique steady stateequilibrium {c*,p*,i*,D* } solving
(18), (19), (20) and (22).




Thus, 8(l/D~)/al> 0 and thereexists a unique 1* satisfying (24). With this, (22),gives D*and (18)
and (19) givesp~ = [~/(~4)I [(l+p)/13f’(l*)] andc~ = [(y-l)/y] [(l+Op)/(l+p)] [13f’(l*)l*/a0] . a
Considernowthe impactofan exogenous increase in the matching ratea0 and moneygrowth
rate p:
15Proposition 2. (ImpactofTrade Frictions) In a pure monetary equilibrium with a = a0, äi*/ a0>
0, 8D~/ a0> 0, a(w/p)*/ a0> 0, and ap*/ a0 <0.
Proof: Substituting(22) into (24) gives the equilibrium locus determining 1*:
~~J~1(l+Og)1P = {a~(1)(X!) }{!~}P (25)
since theright hand side of (25)is strictly decreasing in Iand increasing in a0, ~i~/ a0
> 0. From
(22), D is increasing in both a0 and iso that aD*/a0> 0. From (18)w~/p~ = [y/(y.1)] 13f’(i*)/(l+p)
and thus a(w/p)*/a0 <0. Finally, since f’(l)lis increasing in 1, ap*/a0
< 0. a
Intuitively, an increase in thematching rateincreases the marginal benefit ofwage income,
as it is able to purchase more consumption variety. This shifts labor supply out and lowers the
equilibriumreal wage. Theresultant increase inequilibrium workeffortand matchingrateincreases
realincomes and composite consumption.
Proposition 3. (Impact ofMoneyGrowth andInflation) In a pure monetary equilibrium with a =
a0, ~l~/ p <0, ~D*/ p <0, a(w/p)*/ p <0, and ap*/ ~ >0.
Proof: From (25) it is immediate that a highermoneygrowthrate increases the lefthand side while
reducingtherighthand side. As therighthand side of(25)is strictly decreasing in 1, itmust be that
ai*/ap <0. Since D is increasing in i from (22), 3D*/ p <0. From (18) a decreasing j* implies a
higher nominal wage and lower marginal product and this gives ap*/ p > 0. From (20) and CES
preferences, note that (w/p)* = [(1-ri)/ril[D*/(1J)]1P; as p discourages D* and workeffort, 8(w/p)*1
p <0.
These results are not too surprising. Moneygrowthcreates an inflationtax effect which, for
a given matching rate, decreases both labor demand and supply and equilibrium work effort. Real
16money balances used to finance labor declines and lower real incomes reduces composite
consumption. This negative wealth effect of inflation is consistent with many standard general
equilibrium models which predict a negative relationship between inflation and market activity.
However, as we shall see below, the abilityoftraders in the economyto affect the “frequency” of
exchange opportunities and the extent ofsearch frictionscan drasticallychange the characterization
ofsteady state equilibriaand even theimpact ofinflation on real activity.
Equilibria with Endogenous Shopping Effort
We now return to the general model outlined in Section II, where a = a(s) = a0
+ a,s. For
a given shopping time allocation s,equation (24) correspondsto an efficiency condition for optimal
workeffort. Substituting (22) into (24) gives the LL locus:
~(1 +Op)1 P(1 +p)P = {a(s)h1(Y (~)Pf1(o}{1 1s}1 (26)
Fora given work effort allocation 1, equation (21) corresponds to an efficiency condition foroptimal
shopping effort. Substituting (19) into (21) gives the SS locus:
a(s) y—1
= a’(s)Y(l~OP) (27)
A steadystatecanbe characterized by {i*,s* } satisfying(26) and (27). Theseconditions lead to the
follow propositions:
Proposition 4. (Characterization ofLL and SS Loci)
(i) For p 0 sufficiently small, duds LL < 0, for p 1 sufficiently large dudsILL> 0, and there
exists 0 < p < 1 such that dl/ds ILL> 0 for s < S < 1-1 and di/ds ILL < 0 for s < s < 1.
(ii) The SS locus is strictly increasing in the (s,l) space: duds Iss > 0.
17Proof: See Appendix
TheLLlocus denotes theoptimalresponseofworkeffort to achangein shopping effort. For
p sufficiently large, a greater substitutability betweencomposite consumption and leisureimplies
that an exogenous increase in s raises the marginalbenefits ofworkeffort and causes a substitution
towardscomposite consumption. For p sufficiently small, less substitutability betweencomposite
consumption and leisureimplies that an exogenous increase in s will actuallyreduce incentives for
work effort as households substitutes towards leisure. The SS locus denotes the optimal response
of shopping effort to a change in work effort. An exogenous increase in work effort lowers the
marginalbenefit oflabor supplyand, attheoptimum, this mustbeequated with themarginal benefits
of shopping effort. Since consumption per type, c~, is strictly decreasing in s, an increase in
shopping effort is necessary.
Inlight oftheseproperties, we can divide the characterization ofequilibriainto severalcases
and analyze the effects ofsearch frictions and inflation foreach.
Proposition 5. Given p sufficiently small, there exists a unique steady state equilibrium {l*,s*}
suchthat as*/aa0 <0, 8l”~/0a0 >0, ~3s~/~p >0, and au*/ap <0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Intuitively, a reduction in tradefrictions,ascaptured by an increase in a0, generates apositive
wealth effect which causes households to lower shopping effort and enjoy greater leisure and a
substitution effect towards work effort. The SS locus shifts upwards in the (s,1) plane as shown in
Figure 1. Consequently, there is an increase in composite consumption and realbalances, and real
wages decline from the increase in labor supply.
An increase in theinflation rateinduces household’s to substitute away from work effort and
18towards shopping time. Figure 1 illustrates this unique steady state and shows that an increase in
p shifts both theLL and SS loci downward. Note that in thecase where p =0 and 0 =0, money is
superneutral. However,the Cobb-Douglasspecification is a “knife-edge” case where the elasticity
of substitution ratio F is completely independent ofthe inflation tax effects. With p small, these
results primarily stems from a wealth effect created by cash transfers to households.
Proposition 6. For p sufficiently large, there exists a unique steady state (i*,s* } where
(i) as*/aa0
< 0 while the effect on l~ is generally ambiguous (with as*/aa0
= 0 for p = 1).
(ii) For y-l> l/(1-4), as~/ap<0 and au*/ap <0,
(iii) For y-l < 1/(1-4), as*/ap >0, and for 1 <(y-l) < 1/(l-4), or 0 sufficiently small, al*/ap>
0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Recall that with p sufficiently large, both the SS and LL locus are upward sloping. An
increase in a0tends to reduce the optimal choice ofs for a given 1, shifting the SS locus upward in
the (s,1) plane. This is the pure wealtheffect ofthe improved matching technology. However, it
also increases theoptimalchoice ofi givens, shifting theLL locus upward. While both effects lead
to a reduction in shopping time, the impact on work effort depends upon whether or not the
substitution effect of a0outweighs thewealtheffect. Inthe linear example where p = 1, theseeffects
exactlycancel and there is no overall change in either the matchingrate orequilibrium work effort
(see Figure 2).
To obtain some intuition forthese results, consider thecase where 0 = 0. A greater money
growth rate lowers work effort for a given shopping effort, shifting the LL locus downward in the
(s,l) plane. This is the negative wealth effect ofthe inflation tax. For y sufficiently large,the SS
19locus will be steeper LL and the decline in work effort lowers the marginal incentives to invest in
shopping effort (see Figure 3, Case II). Noticethat from (22) composite consumption D* falls, and,
since UL/UD is a constant, (20) implies an increase in real wages as the marginal productoflabor
rises. Intuitively, ifthepreferencefor variety is small, and hencesearchfrictions are not important,
inflation decreases investment in shopping time, employment, and economicactivity.
However, for y sufficiently small the LL locus will be steeper than SS and the decline in
work effort creates a substitution towardsshopping effort. Consequently, the resulting increase in
thematchingrate increases themarginalbenefits ofwage income and theincentive to increase labor
supply. It is precisely this positive feedback which canlead to an overall increase in work effort and
employment (see Figure 3, Case I). Intuitively, if the preferencefor variety is large, and hence
searchfrictions are important, theninflation can increaseshopping time, employment, andeconomic
activity. In this case an increase in the money growth rate increases composite consumption, D*,
and lowersthereal wage rate. This result is in stark contrastto the model which simply assumes a
fixed matching rate.
Proposition 7. (Multiple Equilibria) For0 < p < 1, there exists the possibility of multiple (non-
degenerate) steady states. Ifso,
(i) Equilibria can be ranked by a monotone increasing relationship between 1* and s~,
and for 0 sufficiently small,
(ii) Sign{81*/5p} =Sign{as*/ap},
(iii) therewill be at least one equilibriawhere aI*/ap > 0 and as*/ap > 0.
This proposition can be verified graphically. Consider the case where the LL locus is upward
sloping for s small and downward sloping fors large. Since the SS locus is upward sloping and all
20equilibria must occur along it, (i) is immediate. Since SS is linear, if LL is steeperthan SS at the
origin, then thereis either a uniqueequilibria [describedby Proposition 5 orProposition 6(u)] oran
odd number ofsteady states (Figure 4, Case I). Since a higher money growth rate shifts the entire
LL locus downward, movementofequilibriaalong the SS locus implies 1* ands~ must move in the
same direction and for 2n-1, n 2, steady states implies that n - 1 of those equilibria will be
characterizeby al*/ap > 0 and 3s*/3p > 0. IfSS is steeper thanLLclose to the origin, thereis at
least two steady states or, in general, an even number(Figure 4, Case II). Again, a higher money
growth rateshifts SS downward, implying that 1* and s”~must move together. Furthermore, forevery
equilibriawhere al*/ap <0 and as*/ap <0, thereexists one where al*Iap >0 and as*/ap >0.
The possibility ofmultiple equilibria againarises from the positive feedback effectsbetween
the optimal choicesofworkeffort and investment in exchange activity. It is this interaction between
employment and shopping time which not only creates a channel by which inflation can lead to
increased economic activity but can also generate a multiplicity ofsteady states.
As an illustration oftheexistenceofmultiple equilibria, consider y = 2, ~ = 0.4, p = 0.8, ~
= 0.8, a0
= 0, a, = 8, 13 = 0.99. Figure 6 plots the roots of(26) as a functionof 1, where s has been
substituted out from (27). Forp =0, itindicatesthat there is a low output equilibria,where 1=0.104
and s = 0.208 and ahigh outputequilibria, where 1=0.313 and s = 0.626. Raisingthe inflation rate
to p = 0.10 increases work and shopping effort in the low outputequilibria to 0.125 and 0.256 and
reduces work and shopping effort in the high output equilibriato 0.298 and 0.609.
21IV. Some Extensions and Appliations
This sectionconsiders several extensions to our multiple matching model which enables it
to address some other important issues relating to inflation and real activity. First, we look at the
relationship betweeninflation and the capital stock, second, weanalyze relativepricedetermination,
and third, endogenous firm entry.
Inflation and the Capital Stock
Oneofthe central issues in monetary economics, dating back to Mundell (1963) and Tobin
(1965), is how productive capital accumulation is related to inflation. Money-in-the-utility function
models [Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975)] tends to support a superneutrality result, cash-in-
advance models with either endogenous labor [Cooleyand Hansen (1989)] ora finance constraint
on capital goods {Stockman (1981)] predicts that inflation depresses the capital stock, and
overlapping generations approaches [e.g., Drazen (1981)] support thepresenceofa “Mundel-Tobin”
effect where inflationencourages capital investment.
We can incorporateproductive capitalquite easilyintoour matchingframework by allowing
firms to store unsold output which is thenusedin thefollowing period’s productionprocess. With
this, consider a standard Cobb-Douglas technology given byf(l,,k1) = ~ where k, is thecapital
stock, 0<4 <1, and assume full capital depreciation. With this, the firm’s value function can be
expressed as
V(th,,k,) = max f(11,k,) — ac,(o’) — k1~1
+
The firm’s first order conditions, evaluated at steady state,will imply
22= ~ w ~(l+p) (28)
~yl 13f1(14,k4)
13fk(l4,k4) = 1 (29)
Thus, a steadystateequilibrium is given by {p4,c4,l*,s*,k*} solving (19), (20), (21),(28), and (29).
The modified versions of the SS and LL loci are given by (27) and
1~(l +Op)’ ~(l+p)P = {a(s)h1 1)(~)13J}P{1 lS} (30)
here J~~[13(1-4)}~’~”~.Since the steady statecapital-labor ratio is constant, so is the marginal
product oflabor, given by J. Thus, (30) and (27)solve exclusively for (l*,s* }, with the steadystate
capital stock k* determined by (29). Consequently, since the marginal product of capital is
increasing in labor, any equilibrium increase in 1* will leadto an increase in k*.
The characterization ofthis LLlocus in (30) remains largely unchanged from that given in
Proposition 4 for p bounded away from unity. Thus, wecanconclude the following:
(i) for p sufficiently small, thereexists a unique steady statewhere as*/ap > 0, al*/ap <0, and
ak*/ap <0.
(ii) for p sufficiently large,there exists a unique steady statewhere as*/ap > 0, al*/ap > 0, and
8k*/3p >0.
(iii) for 0 < p < 1, thereexists the possibility ofmultiple equilibria. Among those where al*/ap
>0, we haveak*/ap >0.
Result (i) is immediate in that at the limiting case of p = 0, s~ and 1* will correspond to exactly
Proposition 5. Thus, therewill be a negative impactofinflationon thecapital stock. To see (ii) note
that for p = 1, the constancyof the marginal product of laborimplies that (30) will determine a
23unique s” while (27) pins down 1*. The reasoning behind (iii) is entirely analogous to the multiple
equilibriadiscussion in theprevious section. Thus, ourmodel doescontain equilibriawhereinflation
can positively impact capital accumulation.
Relative Prices
The previous sections emphasizedhow moneygrowth and inflation influences real activity
through it’s impact on household investmentin exchange activity and hencesearch frictions. In this
section weconsidera different channel and analyze howthe extent oftrading frictions and inflation
influence relative prices.
Inparticular, wesimplify and extendthe model by exogenously fixing the matching rate, a
= a0, and leisureand introduce a second sectorspecializingin theproductionofa homogenous good.
Households havepreferences overboth the composite consumption good, given by (2)and sold on
the searchmarket as before, and homogenous good Q. They possess a homeproduction technology
with which to produce and sell Q on a frictionless and competitivemarket atprice Z~. Households
allocate theirunit oftime between supplying laborto the market, I, and home production, h.
Assumption 4. (Preferences and Technology)
(i) Householdlifetime utility is given by,
V = 13~U(D1(~),Q1) (31)
where D1 is a composite consumption good given by (2) and Q, is a homogenous good.
(ii) The market production technology is given by (4) and each household’s home-production
technology is given by g(h), where g satisfies g ~‘> 0, g “ < 0, g(0) = 0 and the Inada
conditions, lim10 g “(h) = o°and lim1~, g ‘(h) = 0.
24Household’s thus choose {c,,c,’, Q,, I,) to maximize (1) subject to
M1
+ W/,. — f P1(~)c1(~)d~ + Z1g(l —li) — Z1Q1
+ T~— M1~1 0
X(h)
The firm’s problemis identical to before and themarket-clearingcondition for thecompetitive good





— = g (1-I ) (33)
z
w~ = (1±) 13f~’(l 4)
p4 y’ l+p
* l+op c = (35)
wherez~ = (Z,/M~s)* and w*I* = 1. Equation (32) equatesthe marginalbenefits of consuming from
thematching market sector with that ofconsuming from the competitivehome production market,
and (33) states that the implicit realwage earnedfrom home productionis equated with it’s marginal
product.
Rearranging these conditions, we arriveata single condition determiningthe steady state 1*,
F[D*,g(l_14)](l+Op) = iii g(l_l*) (36)
Y l~g’(l-l~)
where F ‘~L’~D and ~L= ULL, ~D= DDD, and acondition determiningthe relative price ofhome to
matching market goods,
25= ~JL fi’(l ) = F(D *Q~ 1 POP) 13f’(l ~)1 * (37)
p4 Y l~Pg’(l—l~) l+p g(l—l4)
Notice that from (23), as the preference for variety diminishes and p -~13-l,this relative price
converges to thecompetitive valueoftheratio ofmarginal productivity acrossthe homeand market
sectors. With this we makethe followingobservations:
Proposition 8. (Trade Frictions, Inflation, and Relative Prices)
(i) Given FD < 0 and FL> 0, al*/3a0> 0 , a(z*/p*)/aa0 <0, al~/aP<0 , a(z*/p*)/ap <0
(ii) Given FD=0 = F1,al*/3a0= 0 , 8(z*/p*)/8a0= 0; for 0 =0, a/*/ap =0, a(z*/p*)/ap <0, and
for 0 > 0, l*/ap <0 , a(z*/p*)/ap <0.
Proof: See Appendix
Intuitively, case (i) indicates that as the severityofmarket frictions diminish, and a0 rises,
there is a shift in demand away from homogenous goods to differentiated products, reducing the
relative priceofthehomeproductiongood. As a result,there is an increase in theallocationofwork
effort to the matching market sector, leading to a reduction in the real wage. An increase in the
inflation rate directly lowers real income and the real wage earned in matchingmarket production.
As a result, demandis shiftedaway from matching market to homeproduction. While the increase
in demandtends to increase the relativeprice ofhome-produced goods, the inflation tax effect on
real wages in the market sector dominates and the relative price ofmatchingmarket goods rises.
The Cobb-Douglas case (ii) is once again a knife-edge case where the elasticity ratio is
independent ofconsumption levels. An increase in cc0 leads to a greater matching rate and demand
for matching market goods. However,this effect is exactly off-set by an equi-proportional decrease
in demand for each consumption type. Also, if 0 = 0, money will be superneutral in affecting the
26equilibriumemployment allocation, but theinflationtax still increasesthe relativepriceofmatching
market goods. For 0 >0, households receive cash transfers prior to shopping, and this creates an
offsettingeffect that reduces work effort in the matching market while still increasing the relative
priceofmatchingmarket goods.
Several empirical studies [e.g., Garber (1982) and Rogers and Wang (1993)] offer evidence
in support ofourfinding that inflation discourages market activity and increases the relativeprice
ofmarket goods.
Firm Entry, theMatching Technology, and Welfare
In this final extension, we consider an alternative method to endogenize the transactions
technology. Previously, wehave always normalized the measure offirms to be unity; this section
considers theissue ofoptimal firmentryandhow suchdecisions are influencedbythe moneygrowth
rate. To isolate this effect, we simplify the model with an inelasticlabor supply and shopping effort
and set 0 = 0. Letting N denote the measure offirms, it will be convenientto denote R(N) as the
ratioofthe mass offirms contacted by each household to the total measureoffirms, R(N)+ ct(N)/N.
Assumption5: (Matching Technology)Theratio ofmatches to the measureoffirms, R(N), satisfies
R’(N) 0 and R(0) =0.
We impose a fixedper-periodfirmentrycost ofK >0 and allow themeasureoffirms to vary
subjectto an ex-post zero profitcondition givenby ê(~’) = KO~
f[u1(~Y)]- -~c~(~) = K (38)
Sincebothhouseholds and firms take this matchingtechnology as given, theiroptimization problems
will be identical to before, with shopping time and leisure normalizedto zero. With U(D) = D, a
27steady state withfinn entry is thus characterizeby {p*,l*,D*,N*} satisfying 1* = 1/N, (18), (19),
(22), and ê”~ = K. Substituting (18)into (19) and both into (38) gives
* w* y - 1 13f”(lIN) 1 ) (39)
R(N)Np4
‘( R(N)N l+p
f(~l - ~ ~ = K (40)
NI Nf(l/1V)l+p y
roposition 9. The measure of firms and hence product variety is strictly increasing in the money
growth rate ji, i.e., dN/dp >0.
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. An increase in the inflation rate
increases the monopolistic markup and, fora given N, firm profits and ownerconsumption. This
encourages the entry ofnew firms and product variety. Ofcourse, this may be an oversimplified
result as generalizing to allow households a work effort choice may put a limit on the this entry
effect ofinflation.
Given the absence ofleisureand zero profits on thepart offirms, it is quite straight forward
to check whetherornot this inflation effect on entryimproves the matching technology sufficiently
to improve steadystatehousehold and aggregate welfare. This involves computing the equilibrium
effect onV~ = [l/(1_p)]D* and leads to thefollow conclusion:
Proposition 10.
With endogenous entry, the optimum rate ofmoneygrowth is determined as follows:
(i) Given R’(N) = 0, the unique optimal money growth rate which maximizes steady-state
welfare is = 13 - 1.
28(ii) Given that R’(N) > 0 and NR’(N)IR(N) is non-increasing in N, there is a uniquepositive
optimal moneygrowth rate p4 >0 for sufficiently low time-discounting and a sufficiently
large curvature forthe preference over variety.
Proof: See Appendix.
By Proposition 9, a higher rate of money growth encourages firm entry. Since both the
number and fraction ofproducts contactedis increasing in N, firmentryincreases the densityofthe
productspace and reduces trading frictions. Ifthematching technology is linear, then the optimal
inflation rate exactly correspondsto what can be interpretedas “Friedman’srule” of p4
= 13 - 1 and
this is a unique interior optimum. If the matching technology is such that the fraction of firms
located is increasing in the number ofentrants, the optimal inflation rate can indeed be positive.
Anyinflation ratelower than this worsens search frictions and impedes consumption variety. As a
result a positive inflation rate permits households to enjoy greater variety and, as long as the
subjective discounting factoris not too small and product variety is sufficiently important, this effect
can dominate the inflation tax effect on households discussed in the last section.
VI. Conclusion
This paper has investigated implications of a multiple matching model of money for the
effects ofmonetary growth and inflation on economic activity. The use of a multiple matching
technique, where search frictions arecaptured by limited consumption variety, allows the model
generalizes various aspects ofthe traditional money-search literature, including pricedetermination
and the divisibility and storability ofgoods and money. A variety ofissues linking inflation to real
activity are analyzed. The common conclusion shared by all of them is that the frictions which
29motivate monetary exchange are not simply a veil, they have real consequences on the economic
activity, and are themselves generally not invariant to monetary and inflation policy.
The basic model weanalyze is a productionvariant ofa multiple matching model ofmoney
where both optimal work and shopping effort are determined jointly. We find that a positive
feedback between these two decisions not only creates a channel by which inflation positively
influences productive market activity, but also generate the possibility of multiple steady state
equilibria. This latter finding suggests that the lack of strong empirical evidence supporting a
positive ornegative impact ofsteady inflation in industrialized countries may be the result of an
economyin transition across multiple equilibria. However,our steadystate analysis cannot address
the stability ofthese steady states and the transitional dynamic response to changes in the money
growth rate. Given our results, this undertaking appears to be a fruitful avenue forfuturework.
We thenconsidered several related issues. First, incorporatingcapital accumulation into the
model preserves manyofthesefeatures, with theadditional result that a Mundel-Tobineffect, where
steady state inflation and the capital stock are positively related, can exist in equilibria where
inflation increases work and shopping effort. Second, in ourhome production model, we find that
the extentofsearch frictions can influence relativeprices and that inflationcan increase and distort
and therelativeprice ofgoods across markets with varying degrees of tradingfrictions. Third, we
endogenizing the matching technology with the optimal entryoffirms. In this example, inflation,
which raises the monopolistic mark-up, encourages firm entry and product variety. The resultant
reduction ofsearch frictions canlead to a positive optimal rateofinflation.
The results of this paper also complementary to some earlier work by Li (1994,1995)
evaluating the consequences of inflation in search-theoretic models of money, In a fixed price
30indivisible search model ofmoney, these papers concluded that a tax on money balances can indeed
positively influencesearch activity, stimulate the accumulation ofinventories, and increase welfare.
Ourpaper suggeststhat theseconclusions may not havebeenjust an artifactoftheindivisible nature
offiat money and inventoryrestrictions assumed by these models and are robust to generalizations
to the search environment.
Finally, this paperhas demonstrated that it is possible to construct search theoreticmodels
of money which canbe applied to a wide variety ofissues in monetary economics. For example,
once could analyzeif sucha model can capture the liquidity effectsofmonetary shocks and their
implications forthe cyclical behavior ofreal variables. For future work, it may also interesting to
allow firms to borrow from credit markets suchthat theyare not completely subjectto theexpost
cash constraint for wage bills. In sodoing, one may analyze the consequencesofinflation on the
credit market, especially, the financial intermediationratio and theloan-deposit interest rate spread.
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APPENDIX
Firm’s First Order Conditions
Letting ~.bethemultiplier associated with (16’) and assuming theconstraints are strictly binding, the
firm’s first order conditions for I, and p,’ can be written as:
f3V(th11) [c (ciY) + ac1((~)’) ~ = _______
1+p : t3p”
f’[l1(~)] = 13V(th11) +
1i~t
and where, from (11), ac,’/ap,’ = -yc,’/p,’. The envelope condition is given by




(i) Without lossofgenerality,let a0 =0. Notice that the left hand side of(26) is independentof
1 and s. The right hand side of(26) canbe written as
I I P
-1 — (1 _l_s)hi) —~ RHS~J~ = 1—134a~ ~
Thus, theright had is strictly decreasing in I[d(RHS~)/dk0].Differentiating this expression
with respect to s gives
dRHSLL = {iiip~a~}~s~ l-l-sY~ 1-i-s - (1~) (Al)
ds y i’~ y—l s
For p = 0, this expression is strictly negative, implying dllds ILL < 0, and for p = 1, this
expression is strictly positive, implying dl/ds I,~> 0. We also see that fors sufficiently small,
(Al) is positive and for s -~ (1-I), (Al) is negative. Thus, for a given 1 there exists
35V
S =(oI 1+o)(1-I), where a = p/[(l-p)(1-i)]. such that (Al) is positive fors < s, implying
duds ILL> 0 and negative for s> s, implying dudsILL<0.
(ii) From (27), a sufficient condition for dl/dsl~5
> 0 is given by a”(s) 0. This is certainly
satisfiedwith ourlinear matching technology, which implies an increasing and linear SS
locus, a
Proposition 5.
Consider the limiting case where p = 0, the Cobb-Douglas case. Equations (26) and (27)can be
written as




Since the (LL) locus in (A2) is downward sloping while the (SS) locus in (A3) in upward sloping
in the (s,l) plane, thereexists a unique steady state (1*,s~ }. An increase in a0 increases 1 and shifts
SS upwards. As a result,as*/aa0 <0,au~ia~ > 0. To analyze the effect ofan increase in money
growthp. substitute (A3)into (A2) to get
l—~ (1 — s)a1 .~, 1
= (~) - (A4)
a0
+ a1s y~1
since the right hand side of (A4) is increasing in p and decreasing is s, as*/ap > 0. From (A2),
al*/ap <0. From (A3), the overall matching rate cc increases.
Proposition 6. Consider the limitingcase where p = 1, thelinear specification. Equations (26)can
be written as
+p) = a(s)h/~_~)pf/(l) (AS)
El
and (27) is given by (A3). Since therighthand side of(AS) is strictly increasing in s and decreasing
in 1, both the SS and LL locus are upward sloping in the (s,l) plane. By substituting (A3) into (AS)
we can verify a unique steady state given by
S4
= {E(1+p)(l+0p)~}~’/cc1 - a~/a
1 (A6)




(i) It is immediate that as*/aa0
= -1/a, <0 and al*/aa0
= 0.
(ii) Forthe effects ofinflation, we set a0
= 0 forconvenience. Consider the case where ~i <0,
which is guaranteed for a sufficiently large(y-l)> 1/(1-4). From (A6) it is clearthat as*/ap
<0. To analyze the impact on work effort, notice from (A7) that (4-l)ilc - 1 > 0. This
implies that 0>0 supports apositive impactof p on 1*. Take the limiting case where 0 = 1,
the exponentialon (l+p) becomes i1c4 - 1 <0, implying au*Iap <0.
(iii) Next, consider the case where i~i> 0, which is guaranteed for a sufficiently small (y-1) <
l/(1-4). From (A6) it is clear that as*/ap > 0. To analyze the impact on work effort, notice
from (A7)that for 0 = 0, aI*/aj.t >0. As 0 >0 supports a negative impact ofp on l~, take
the limiting case where 0 = 1, theexponential on (l+p) becomes iji4 - 1, which is positive
for(y-l)> 1, implying au*Iap >0, and negative for (y-l) < 1, implying au*/ap <0.a
Proposition 8
(i) Suppose FD<0 and FL> 0. From (22) we have D = [(y-l)/y]a0
1~’~[(1+0p)/(l+p)]13f’(l)i,
increases with 1and a0 and decreases with p. An increase in a0 decreases the lefthand side
of (36), while the right hand side is decreasing in 1. Thus, au*/aa0 > 0. From (37) it is
immediatethat a(z*/p*)/aa0 <0. An increase in p decreases D and increases the left hand
side of(36), implying au*/ap <0. From the second equalityin (37), a(z*/p*)/ap <0.
(ii) GivenF~ = 0 = FL, it is clear that a0 will not have any overall effects. For 0 = 0, changes in
p will have no effects on I while, from (37), a(z*/p*)/ap <0. For0 > 0, an increase in p
raises the lefthand side of(36),leading to l*/ap <0 and a(z*/p*)/ap <0. a
Proposition 9
With ourfunctional form forthe productiontechnology, equation (37) maybe written as
- Yl) = K
N 1+p y
which implies
N~= ![l - ~P(xi!)] (A8)
K l+p y
37Differentiating with respectto p and rearranging gives
dN N1~ 13
— = (—)>° (A9) dp K (1+p)2 Y
which verifies theproposition. a
Proposition 10
(i) From (22)V is proportional to 1P [N’~R(N)”~’1]/(l+p).Differentiating with respect
to p gives
= (1+p)N~~RY~[(_L-~) + (_L)NR ‘(N)]~ - N~~Ry1
dp y-l 1-? Rd p
Equating to zero, substituting in dN/dp from (A9) and simplifying this expression yields the
optimality condition
- + N(__)’~)] 1 ~—~_(iJ!) = 1 (AlO)
y-i y-l R N’1~Kl~p •y.
Suppose a(N) = a0 which is independent ofN. Since theleft-hand side of(AlO) is strictly
decreasing in p there exists a unique optimal p which satisfies this condition. Substituting
(A8) into (A10) gives
[1 — ~I~(’Y—l)] [1 — _~‘_1~~—~3 = 1
y l+p y l-~-p
which implies p4
= 13 -1, thus verifying (i).
(ii) Suppose insteadthat R’(N) > 0. Provided that NR’(N)/R(N) is non-increasing in N, (AlO)
againimplies a unique p satisfyingthis condition as theleft hand side is strictly decreasing
in p. Substituting (A8) into theleft hand side of (A10)gives
~(p) [~ (1) + 1NR/(N)][1+P Y~] = i
where dIVdp <0. Taking, forexample, 13 = 1, wecan easily show that
38~(0) i + 1NR’(N) 1 - ~(L!) -1 > 1
yR(N)
which implies a unique p4 >0. Similar resultcan be obtained forsufficiently high values of
13 when y is sufficiently small, thus verifying (ii). a
39FIGURE 1 - Equilibria with p =0
Effect ofIncrease in a0 Effect ofIncrease in ji
FIGURE 2- Equilibria with p = 1,












40FIGURE3- Equilibria with p = 1,
Effect ofIncrease in ii, 0 = 0
Case 1: y Sufficiently Small




























41FIGURE 4- Multiple Equilibria,
Effect ofIncreasein ~t (0=0)
Case 1: LL steeperthan SS at Origin








42FIGURE 5 - Example ofMultiple Equilibria
Roots ofthe Equilibrium Condition
(y = 2,r~ = 0.4, p = 0.8, 4 = 0.8, a0= 0, a, = 8, 13 = 0.99 and p = 0,0.1)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
43